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In response to growing public and policy concern about conflicts of interest (COI) in university 
research, academic institutions in North America and Europe have introduced policies to 
manage COI. However, depending on their form and content, COI policies can be more or less 
helpful in the effective management of COI. In this paper, we examine and compare the design 
and content of COI policies at two Canadian research universities (the Université de Montréal 
and the University of Waterloo), which we suggest, exemplify two general categories or poles on 
a spectrum of policy approaches. We describe 1) a legalistic approach that promotes a concise 
but rigid structure, and 2) an inspirational approach that encourages principle-based deliberation 
and wider interpretation. Each of these approaches has its particular strengths and 
weaknesses. We conclude with some recommendations to help administrators and policy 
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Introduction 
Academics and policy makers in North America and Europe are increasingly concerned about 
the risks associated with conflicts of interest (COI) in the University (Campbell et al., 2007; 
Coyne, 2005; Sugarman, 2005), and most institutions have responded by introducing COI 
policies and guidelines. However, as we will show through a comparison of COI policies at two 
Canadian universities, not all policies are created equal. Depending on their form and content, 
COI policies can be more or less helpful in the effective management of COI situations. 
 
A COI may be defined as “a situation in which a person has a private or personal interest 
sufficient to appear to influence the objective exercise of his or her official duties as, say, a 
public official, an employee, or a professional” (MacDonald et al., 2002, 68). Such conflicts may 
be characterized as real or potential (i.e., an actual COI or a situation that threatens to evolve 
into a COI), and/or apparent (i.e., perceived to be a conflict, whether real or potential). Even 
‘merely apparent’ conflicts of interest can do significant damage to individual and institutional 
reputations and relationships.  
 
In the university research milieu, COI occur primarily but not exclusively when researchers have 
a financial or personal interest (e.g., in commercializing the results of their research) sufficient to 
appear to influence the objective exercise of their official duties either as contributors to the 
shared body of knowledge or as educators. As many scholars have noted, COI pose important 
ethical and policy challenges for faculty, staff, students and administrators (Lewis et al., 2001; 
Lipton et al., 2004; Resnik and Shamoo, 2002); if left unaddressed, COI can seriously 
undermine the public’s trust in professors and universities. But it should also be recognised that 
COI are not inherently unethical, and that sometimes, institutional arrangements make COI 
acceptable, even inevitable. So, in effect what matters, ethically, is that individuals and 
institutions deal appropriately with COI when they arise (MacDonald et al., 2002; Perlis et al., 
2005).  
 
As with other large organizations (e.g., corporations, non-profit groups, government 
departments), universities have responded to the challenge by promulgating policies designed 
to manage or avoid COI. In the United States, the introduction of university COI policies was 
driven in part by federal government regulations (enacted in 1995) requiring that all research 
institutions seeking funding from the US Public Health Service, which includes the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), to have internal policies and procedures to manage COI; the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) has a similar policy (Public Health Service, 1995). All university 
faculty members applying for research funds from the NIH or NSF are required to disclose, to a 
designated member of their institution, any ‘Significant Financial Interests’ (e.g., financial 
relationships exceeding $10,000 in payment or 5 percent ownership in a company) that could 
cause or appear to cause bias to publicly funded research; however, setting such a formal limit 
may be somewhat arbitrary, and ignore the differences between individuals with regards to what 
amount of money is ‘interesting’ (Tereskerz, 2003). These regulations provide a general 
structure and minimum set of standards for university COI protocols; more than 70% of US 
research institutions have subsequently implemented COI policies that go beyond the minimal 
federal government requirements (Cho et al., 2000). Like their American counterparts, most 
Canadian universities have COI policies, but they are not uniformly or comprehensively 
regulated by provincial or federal legislation that set out common minimum requirements 
(Ogbogu, 2007).1  
                                                 
1 One exception is COI in research involving human subjects, which is governed by provincial legislation 
(notably in Quebec, which has specific provisions in its Civil Code) and by national policies such as the 
Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Human Subjects (Canadian 
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As with the regulation of other ethically complex problems, policy documents can provide only a 
partial solution to university COI. Even the most thorough documents will lack specificity and 
contain gaps in structure and content, and they are subject to being misunderstood, overridden 
or simply ignored (Krimsky, 2003; Krimsky and Rothenberg, 2001; Lipton et al., 2004). Yet good 
COI policies remain an obvious important first step in the right direction. The question, then, is 
what constitutes a good – or even an ideal – university policy?  
 
It is probably unrealistic, and maybe even misguided, to aim for a single one-size-fits-all model 
or ideal a university COI policy; universities in even one country may be simply too different in 
structure and function. If one looks, for example, at universities in Canada and the US, it is 
evident that there is great diversity in institutional mandate and culture: universities may be 
focused primarily on teaching, research, or professional training (or some combination thereof). 
They may also operate within very different legal contexts, as in the case of state vs. privately 
funded institutions where faculty members are employed by the state (also the case in some 
European universities) or by the institution (common in private institutions in the US, and all 
Canadian universities). Finally, given a variety of US state and Canadian provincial legislation, 
faculty may be subject to different requirements with regards to their conduct within and beyond 
the borders of the university. 
 
Important lessons can, however, be drawn from a close examination of how particular university 
policies seek to address COI in practice. In this paper, we compare the COI policies of two 
Canadian universities: the Université de Montréal and the University of Waterloo. These two 
policies exemplify, we suggest, two general categories or poles along a spectrum of policy 
approaches used by Canadian research universities (and possibly universities in the United 
States and Europe). That is, we propose that COI policies can be usefully thought of as being 
more or less legalistic (Université de Montréal) or inspirational (University of Waterloo) in style 
and content. Our comparison pays particular attention to the policy’s accessibility and layout, its 
general philosophy and preamble, and discussion of rules, definitions, examples, and 
procedures to address COI. We conclude that both the legalistic and inspirational styles have 
important merits and limitations. Our primary aim, in this paper is to highlight the importance of 
developing good (i.e., useful, effective, relevant) COI policies, and to provide practical guidance 
to administrators and faculty involved in the revision of existing or drafting of new COI policies.  
 
A Comparison of Two Policies  
The development and implementation of university COI policies reflects the particular legal 
contexts of universities (e.g., public or privately funded, independent or state regulated), as well 
as the governance decisions of administrators regarding the management and avoidance of 
COI situations. A 2006 pilot study of COI policies at 13 leading Canadian research universities 
uncovered a broad range of documents, from very general statements of principle, to brief 
consideration or mention of COI in a sub-set of other documents (e.g., in guidelines for research 
ethics or academic integrity), to focused COI policies for academic and/or non-academic staff, 
research assistants, and students (Williams-Jones and MacDonald, 2008). Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, these policies also differed substantially in style and content. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Institutes of Health Research et al.). These instruments regulate research in Canadian universities that 
receive funds from provincial and national granting councils. 
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This diversity of COI policy styles can, we suggest, be usefully grouped into two rough 
categories, i.e., those that are legalistic or inspirational in nature.2 By ‘legalistic’ we mean those 
policies that are written in a relatively rigid, legal language and style and that are organised as a 
set of rules and procedures to follow. We contrast this with policies that we define as 
‘inspirational’ in nature; that is, they are written in a common and accessible language, and lay 
out guiding principles and flexible procedures.  
 
To be clear, these are not the only possible categories; there may be other useful ways of 
grouping or organising the diversity of university policies. Further, if one accepts our two rough 
categories, it is important to recognise that they are not rigid or precise. Our preliminary study of 
Canadian university COI policies has shown that policies are spread along a continuum, with 
‘legalistic’ and ‘inspirational’ at opposite poles. Between these two poles, policies may blend 
items from both styles, creating hybrid documents that are more or less legalistic or 
inspirational. Finally, even policies at the poles – such as the two presented in this paper (i.e., 
those of the Université de Montréal and the University of Waterloo) – will not be uniformly 
legalistic or inspirational. Nevertheless, as we will show in the following analysis, the two rough 
categories of legalistic and inspirational provide a useful point of reference or framework with 
which to examine and compare the strengths and limitations of different approaches to 
governing COI in the university context. 
 
Policy Style 
The COI policies of the Université de Montréal (hereafter Montreal) and the University of 
Waterloo (hereafter Waterloo) differ substantially in their structure and style (see Appendices 1 
& 2 for the complete policies). Montreal’s policy is concise, structured and legalistic, while 
Waterloo’s policy is a longer, more readable and inspirational document. Montreal’s policy, 
which was adopted in 1993, consists of only 4 pages and a total of 998 words.3 It is highly 
structured, composed of 8 numbered Articles (Application, Rules, Conflict of Interest, Procedure 
for Disclosure, Treatment of Disclosures, Appeals Committee, Application of Regulations, and 
Coming into Force), each of which is substantiated through numbered sub-clauses or 
statements. The language is formal, even rigid, consisting of declarations or affirmations of what 
constitutes (or does not constitute) appropriate behaviour in relation to COI (e.g., ‘do not’ or 
‘personnel shall’ language). 
 
By contrast, Waterloo’s policy, introduced in 1991 and amended in 2000, is much longer at 1799 
words and more loosely structured; it includes only four subcategories (Preamble, General 
Philosophy and Procedures, Examples, Development of Guidelines and Procedures on Conflict 
of Interest). The language is much less formal (no numbered articles or clauses) and more 
readily understandable; also, the Waterloo document consists of longer sentences and 
paragraphs. The style and vocabulary allow for greater interpretation and require the reader to 
reflect on, rather than simply comply with, detailed rules and procedures.  
 
Preamble and General Philosophy  
Most institutional policies begin with a preamble or introduction that states the purpose and sets 
the tone or general philosophy of the document. Both the Montreal and Waterloo COI policies 
state their intention to provide adequate regulations for university staff in order to protect both 
                                                 
2 In the pilot study of Canadian universities, the COI policies were evenly split between the legalistic 
(7/13) or inspirational (6/13) styles. 
3 This policy was, until the summer of 2007, available on the University website (in PDF format) in both 
French and English although only the French document is legally binding. To facilitate comparison, we 
have referred to the English-version of the policy, on file with the authors and presented in Appendix 1. 
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staff and the institution. More explicitly, Montreal’s policy applies to “teaching and non-teaching 
personnel” while Waterloo’s policy applies to “faculty and staff members”; other Canadian 
university COI policies sometimes include students or “all members of the university” within their 
scope (Williams-Jones and MacDonald, 2008). It is interesting to note that the Waterloo policy 
also includes a simple definition of COI in its preamble, stating that a COI “exists when a 
member of the University is or may be in a position to use research, knowledge, authority or 
influence for personal or family gain or to benefit others to the detriment of the institution” 
(University of Waterloo, 1991). 
 
It is clear in the preamble of the Montreal and Waterloo policies that the aim is to mitigate the 
risks of COI, particularly loss of objectivity, which can result in biased research, and the erosion 
of perceived and actual impartiality of and confidence in staff and the institution. The protection 
of staff and the institution is to be achieved by safeguarding and respecting a set of values. For 
example, Montreal’s policy states in the Preamble, that “To ensure transparency and integrity 
while at the same time respecting the autonomy of the university, the Université de Montréal 
has decided to adopt regulation for avoiding conflict of interest situations and, where necessary, 
protecting both university staff and the institution itself” (Université de Montréal, 1993). The main 
values here are autonomy (of the institution), transparency, and integrity of staff.  
   
Waterloo’s COI policy similarly highlights the importance of integrity. “Whatever the nature of the 
external activities or relationships, the University expects each of its members – faculty, staff, 
student or officer – to act in a manner consistent with a high standard of integrity and ethical 
behaviour” (University of Waterloo, 1991). In addition, it outlines a greater number of values 
such as ethical behaviour, the university’s reputation, and the importance of “transfer[ing] 
knowledge, discoveries, and technology to society for its benefit” (University of Waterloo, 1991). 
In order to promote such values, the Waterloo policy notes that it has chosen regulation to avoid 
COI that can harm the university’s goals; however, it also stipulates that the mere existence of 
COI does not imply that an activity must be prohibited. Seeking counsel and determining 
appropriate behaviour in a specific situation allows the university and the individual to properly 
manage the COI. 
  
While there is much overlap in the values put forth by both universities, Waterloo establishes 
many more principles in its policy. This principle-based approach sets out the fundamental 
rationale, the reason why it is important for the university to have a COI policy. It also 
establishes a framework for deliberation and interpretation with respect to various situations. 
Procedures are found in the section entitled “General Philosophy and Procedures” which 
encourage reflection and dialogue on campus to foster appropriate understanding and 
management of COI. This provides greater latitude of decision-making and action than the more 
rigorous and rigid procedural approach of the Montreal policy. 
  
The Waterloo approach avoids prescriptive directives, such as statements that staff ‘must’ 
negotiate or disclose information, as found in the Montreal policy. Rather, the Waterloo policy 
emphasizes that COI is sufficiently important to manage or avoid, “that members should, of their 
own volition, take the initiative in disclosing conflicts or potential conflict of interest situations.” In 
this manner the university seeks to promote transparency, responsibility, open negotiation and 
consensus. This more inspirational style aims to encourage willing participation rather than 
adherence to rules and it is also an endorsement or expression of trust in the ethical conduct of 
employees. Conversely, the Montreal document is definitional at the outset. Stating what the 
COI policy is, the Preamble (and the rest of the policy) is succinct and unambiguous and avoids 
any philosophical questioning about the nature of COI. It specifies intent and limits interpretation 
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through the use of clear, directive statements such as ‘do not’, ‘personnel shall avoid’ or 
‘personnel shall be obligated to’. 
  
The processes or mechanisms established by these two universities to deal with COI are 
consistent with and reflect the style of their policies. While they both state that disclosure is 
necessary, Montreal requires that staff avoid COI and focuses more narrowly on instructions to 
staff on what to do when confronted with COI; Waterloo requires that staff avoid or manage COI 
depending on the situation and explains why such a process is important. The latter obviously 
provides a more flexible, adaptable approach. The consequences of these differences in 
approach become more evident on closer examination of the general rules of the two policies. 
But before looking at the rules, it is important to examine more closely the means by which the 
two policies define and explain COI. 
 
Definitions 
Arguably, many individuals in academia think of COI in relation to scandals in medical practice 
or improper relations with the pharmaceutical industry, for example, in the Jesse Gelsinger case 
in the United States or the Olivieri and Healey cases in Canada (Koch, 2003; Schafer, 2004). 
However, many COI occur without any dramatic aftermath or media attention. To properly 
identify all types of COI, it is obviously important for policies to include a definition of COI, as 
well as a lexicon of terminology used throughout the document (Owen, 2007). 
 
The Montreal policy does not provide an explicit definition of COI, nor does it define other 
important concepts such as potential or apparent COI; instead, a list of examples is given in 
which a “conflict of interest may arise” for members of the personnel. This failure to define key 
concepts exemplifies how even an apparently very legalistic policy (in terms of language and 
style) may not be ‘uniformly legalistic’ or a perfect fit with our proposed categories; it also, 
however, points to important weaknesses in terms of the structure and content of this policy. 
Waterloo’s policy, on the other hand, provides a short definition of COI at the beginning (in the 
Preamble) and a longer definition mid-way through the document. As mentioned previously, the 
first definition reads as follows: “A conflict of interest, or a potential conflict of interest, exists 
when a member of the University is or may be in a position to use research, knowledge, 
authority or influence for the personal or family gain or to benefit others to the detriment of the 
institution.” Apart from mention of the institution, such a definition is fairly standard if not 
comprehensive. For example, the definition omits reference to apparent COI. On the other 
hand, the second definition in the Waterloo policy is broader and defines, in some detail, 
individual COI (as well as institutional COI and conflict of commitment). 
 
Individual conflicts of interest often derive directly or indirectly from opportunities to 
participate in externally funded research and in a subsequent interplay between the 
results of the research and a faculty member’s personal or financial interests. Such 
situations frequently place faculty and staff members in a position to manage contracts, 
select equipment and supplies, involve graduate students in sponsored research or play 
administrative roles which demand the utmost in integrity and honesty. Even the 
appearance of an apparent conflict can have a negative impact on the University and the 
individual in the eyes of the community. (University of Waterloo, 1991) 
  
Although this definition is broader than the first, it may not be considered as comprehensive 
because it concentrates mostly on financial COI. But what, then, is an appropriate definition of 
COI? There is an extensive literature on what should constitute a precise definition of COI. Yet 
despite broad philosophical agreement on the key elements of COI, there remains debate over 
whether the heart of the issue lies in the risk of corrupting individual judgment or in the risk to 
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the interests of the client or institution (Norman and MacDonald, 2009, in press). We will leave 
these debates aside and simply suggest that any definition should be simple to understand yet 
sufficiently comprehensive and broad to capture key COI situations. The various types of COI – 
real, potential, and apparent COI – may be best illustrated or described through specific 
examples.  
 
Prior to examining specific examples mentioned in the two university COI documents (see the 
following section), the concept of institutional COI and conflict of commitment addressed in the 
Waterloo policy should be considered. Conflict of commitment is defined in the policy as “any 
external activity or undertaking which places an individual in a position which: interferes with or 
prevents the discharge of her-his University responsibilities, as defined by the individual’s 
employment contract.” In general terms, conflict of commitment can be thought of as “the 
umbrella term for issues centering on the allocation of time and energy to fulfill three primary 
academic roles: teaching, research, and public service” (Campbell, 1997, 360). In effect, a 
faculty member might be committed to too many research activities and public service and not 
dedicate sufficient time to their teaching, resulting in a conflict between external interests and 
primary professional or academic responsibilities and commitments. In the interest of simplicity, 
conflict of commitment can be illustrated through examples and integrated within a general 
comprehensive definition of COI. 
 
With regards to institutional COI, the literature generally acknowledges this to be an issue that 
should be further analysed and included in COI policies (Hasselmo, 2002). The Report of the 
Association of American Universities provides some insight into this issue, with the following 
definition of institutional COI:  
 
An institutional financial conflict of interest may occur when the institution, any of its 
senior management or trustees, or a department, school, or other sub-unit, or a related 
organization (such as a university foundation) has an external relationship or financial 
interest in a company that itself has a financial interest in a faculty research project. 
Senior managers or trustees may also have conflicts when they serve on the boards of 
(or otherwise have an official relationship with) organizations that have significant 
commercial transactions with the university. The existence (or appearance) of such 
conflicts can lead to actual bias, or suspicion about possible bias, in the review or 
conduct of research at the university. If they are not evaluated or managed, they may 
result in choices or actions that are incongruent with the missions, obligations, or the 
values of the university (AAU, 2001, 10). 
 
However, it must be noted that institutional COI is often intertwined with individual COI and as 
such is then regulated through the central university COI policy. It is worth questioning, 
however, whether institutional COI regulations should be included within central COI policies, 
which are often written to guide the behaviour of individual faculty members, staff or students. 
Do all university faculty and staff have a responsibility for their institution’s interests? The 
obvious answer to such a question is ‘yes’; yet in practice, things are somewhat more 
complicated.  
 
Since institutional COI usually arise for and are the responsibility of the administrative staff 
(mainly senior administrators, such as Deans or Vice-Principals), the management of these COI 
are commonly out of the hands of most members of the university community. As such, these 
conflicts should most probably be addressed in a separate policy aimed specifically at 
administrative staff. This would allow policy makers – as well as the broader university 
community – to acknowledge and distinguish between institutional and individual COI; it might 
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also enable the formulation and communication of simpler and more effective COI policies to the 
relevant stakeholders. McMaster University is one example of an institution that has a separate 
policy intended for non-teaching personnel and administrative staff, and that focuses to a large 
extent on institutional COI (McMaster University, 2002).  
 
Examples 
An individual COI – whether it be real, apparent or potential – is still a somewhat abstract 
concept, and so examples are important in order give a practical understanding of the nature 
and scope of COI. The examples in COI policies are naturally selective and representative 
rather than comprehensive. Further, although many COI policies may have a legalistic tone and 
structure, the management of COI remains an ethical challenge that cannot be captured entirely 
in legal wording or examples. 
 
The examples in the Waterloo policy cover a number of situations and are broken down into the 
following categories: Favouring of Outside Interests for Personal Gain; Inappropriate Use of 
University Personnel, Resources or Assets; Inappropriate Use of Information; Conflict of 
Commitment; and Inappropriate Involvement in Appointment Process. These examples are 
comparable to those found in the Montreal policy in terms of content, although they differ in style 
and form. For instance, in the Montreal policy, Articles 3.1a) to 3.1d) provide examples of 
possible COI that can arise through interactions with external enterprises. Article 3.1a) notes 
that a “conflict of interest may arise in cases where a member of the personnel: Directly or 
indirectly has monetary or other interest in an external enterprise that deals or is likely to deal 
with the University”. In this example, enterprises are most likely interpreted as being for-profit 
businesses such as pharmaceutical or other technology companies. However, it is unclear 
whether non-governmental or charitable organisations would be included, and so the word 
‘enterprise’ may unduly limit the scope of the policy. The vocabulary used in a policy must be 
precise but not overly limiting, or worse yet, misleading.  
  
An important difference between the Waterloo and Montreal policies is that the examples 
provided in the former are described in far more detail and include a broader range of typical 
COI. The drafters of the Waterloo policy selected examples which demonstrate conduct that is 
clearly irresponsible, i.e., ‘headline conflicts’. That is, they chose examples that are most often 
found in the media, such as “Directing the faculty member’s government sponsored research 
program to serve the research or development needs of a private firm in which the faculty 
member has a financial or other interest” (University of Waterloo, 1991). 
 
It should be noted that most of the examples in both policies have to do with financial COI, 
especially those that arise through researcher collaboration with the private sector. While an 
important issue, many COI in the university setting are not financial (Williams-Jones and 
MacDonald, 2008). For example, a student can be in a COI if, when working as a teaching 
assistant, he or she is asked to evaluate a friend’s exam, as has been reported at the Université 
de Montréal (Gerbet, 2007). We may also find a non-financial COI if a member of staff uses 
confidential information acquired in the course of university activities to advance their personal 
interest, e.g., with regards to their or a family members’ political activities.  
  
Furthermore, while university-industry relationships that raise concern about COI may be more 
common in the applied sciences (such as pharmacology, medicine or engineering), this does 
not mean that COI do not occur in other faculties or departments. If an example in a general 
COI policy is to be useful and relevant for all staff, it should be adapted to the general university 
context. It is obvious that the university community is not homogeneous and that examples of 
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COI in law schools may differ from those arising in medical schools or in the social sciences and 
humanities.  
 
A judicious blend of the precise language of the Waterloo policy with the more comprehensive 
scope of the cases in the Montreal policy might be a useful approach. (The precise language of 
Waterloo, which is in a sense legalistic, and the comprehensive scope of Montreal, which is in a 
sense inspirational, further exemplifies the fluidity of these two categories.) This is the case with 
the Dalhousie University COI policy, where examples take the form of, for instance: “Cases in 
which a university member conducts or participates in a research project which may affect his or 
her financial interests or those of a related business” (Dalhousie University, 2002). This example 
does not restrict its explanation to an enterprise or limit the scope of the definition; it leaves 
room for interpretation without being too vague; and it is relevant to many university contexts, as 
much so in the humanities and social sciences as in the basic or applied sciences. 
 
Rules 
The rules outlined in the Montreal COI policy oblige university personnel to “avoid any situation 
which may entail choosing between personal interests, monetary or other, and those of the 
University” (Université de Montréal, 1993, Article 2.1). In cases where COI cannot be avoided, 
any real, potential or perceived COI must be disclosed to a responsible committee when 
teaching personnel are involved, or to a head of unit in cases involving non-teaching personnel 
(Articles 2.2 & 2.3). In those cases where the person who wants to disclose is in a COI with their 
head of unit or a member of the committee, they may refer their disclosure form to an appeals 
committee. In contrast, the Waterloo policy asks the individual to disclose all real or potential 
COI to their immediate supervisors and to seek counsel from these individuals. Both parties 
must come to an agreement to monitor, avoid or manage the situation. 
 
The rigid and formal ‘rules-based’ regime of Montreal seems likely to be more problematic or 
difficult in its practical application. The strict requirement that staff avoid any COI (prior even to 
disclosure) seems simpler than the Waterloo process. Avoidance and prevention is prioritised 
over discussion and evaluation, a resolution that may be particularly appropriate in the context 
of ‘significant financial interests’, assuming that a clear definition can be given of such interests. 
Yet, a policy that requires personnel to first avoid all COI may be unrealistic, or worse yet, 
incoherent. Strictly speaking, if personnel are to avoid all COI, there seems little point in further 
discussing disclosure.  Article 2.1 of the Montreal policy would have been better phrased as “All 
university personnel shall, to the extent feasible, avoid any situation….” 
 
In a small department, for example, it may be difficult or even impossible to find completely 
impartial evaluators, thus COI in committee processes is inevitable. Further, by stating the 
necessity to avoid all COI situations, individuals may be dissuaded from disclosing issues that 
they are unable to avoid, thereby finding themselves alone to manage COI without support or 
counsel. Finally, a COI – especially one that is potential or apparent – can often be managed, 
assuming that there is a system in place that encourages disclosure, evaluation and dialogue. 
The Montreal policy seems to leave no room for such nuance. 
 
Consider the following example: a professor decides to include in the required course readings, 
a book which he/she has authored, because of the financial gain that will accrue from royalties, 
instead of recommending or requiring an alternative or more appropriate text. This situation is 
an actual COI, because the professor’s financial interests unduly influence the objective 
exercise of his/her duty, i.e., to provide the most appropriate text for the students. If on the other 
hand, the professor’s book is the best material available for students and would be chosen 
regardless of whether the professor received royalties, the situation becomes more apparent 
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than actual. Concerned about the apparent or potential COI, the university might choose to take 
strong or even coercive measures and forbid the use of this book. On the other hand, the 
university (or the professor) might choose to manage the conflict by donating the royalties to a 
student fund or a charitable organisation.4 
 
A policy that strictly forbids professors from using their own books in their courses might prevent 
actual and apparent COI, but it would also be a significant infringement on academic liberty 
(e.g., the liberty to choose appropriate course materials) and may well disadvantage students 
who would then forego reading what might be a very appropriate text. Moreover, such a strict 
policy leaves little or no place for the consideration of potentially creative alternatives to 
managing COI, such as discussing the issue with students in order to arrive at a shared solution 
(e.g., donation of royalties to a charity); a potentially valuable teaching opportunity is thus lost. 
 
In the previous example, the management of COI on a case-by-case basis would allow for a 
more customized solution that could be to the advantage of both the professor and the students. 
The case-by-case COI management approach is best suited to evolving conditions and 
available resources; also, it can foster greater consensus about the management of COI among 
university staff. In such a situation, it may be more realistic and practical to choose to disclose in 
order to manage COI. Nonetheless, such a case-by-case approach also likely requires far more 
up-front discussion about COI and appropriate management strategies, and thus may be more 
complicated and costly (in terms of time) than a requirement to follow more rigid university 
regulations that require individuals to avoid all COI. Finally, as in the case of significant financial 
interests, there may be some types of COI that simply have to be prohibited. 
 
In decisions about the choice of required course readings, COI may also arise for reasons other 
than financial interest; for example, the advancement of a professor’s academic reputation from 
the use of their book instead of an alternative or more appropriate text. Interest in one’s 
reputation is perfectly normal and acceptable; the challenge is ensuring that it not unduly 
influence one’s professional duties. Yet, it is extremely difficult to measure the influence that 
reputation may have on professional behaviour (as compared with financial interests), and thus 
arrive at a straightforward solution. Instead, discussions about academic integrity are likely to be 
a more productive means of sensitising faculty to the diverse interests that may engender COI. 
 
Disclosure is a standard part of the process for dealing with COI, and a means by which 
universities can promote integrity and transparency. Indeed, both the Waterloo and Montreal 
COI policies state this at the outset. However, recent psychological research raises important 
questions about an over-reliance on disclosure mechanisms. First, there is evidence that 
individuals in a COI are often unable to foresee the extent to which a COI may influence their 
professional judgement (Elliott, 2008); important COI may not be taken seriously, and thus go 
unreported. Second, disclosure may well be insufficient, and even lead to further biasing of 
decisions. Instead of providing the information needed to fairly evaluate an interest, other 
individuals involved in decision-making and the management of COI may underestimate the 
extent to which a conflict remains (Cain et al., 2005). 
 
As often acknowledged in the literature, being in a COI is not in itself unethical if properly 
managed. It is important to promote a “balancing of valid interests” (Moore, 2007). Such a 
balance must, however, start with transparency through policy rules that encourage disclosure 
to enable adequate consensus building and achieve plausible compromise among staff, faculty, 
students and the university administration. It is not sufficient, as in the case of the Montreal 
                                                 
4 We thank Chris MacDonald for sharing this helpful example. 
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policy, to require disclosure without providing the tools necessary to manage COI when 
disclosure proves insufficient. Instead, we argue that – as encouraged in the Waterloo policy – 
more inclusive and transparent discussion, consultation and exploration of suitable 
arrangements should be promoted to help faculty identify and manage COI. 
 
Procedures  
Both the Montreal and Waterloo policies describe the manner in which university staff should 
proceed to manage or resolve COI. Waterloo’s policy states that “any member of the University 
community with a conflict or potential conflict should seek the counsel and advice of her-his 
immediate supervisor and disclose the details to that individual” (University of Waterloo, 1991). 
The supervisor will then analyse the situation to determine whether there may be an actual, real 
or potential COI. The supervisor and the member of the university staff will agree on the 
alternatives or options to deal with the COI and ultimately determine a course of action. The 
agreed upon approach or decision will then be documented. If negotiation does not result in a 
consensus, the case will be referred upwards through the line of management. 
  
Waterloo does not use a committee process or structure to evaluate COI cases. Rather, the 
process involves negotiation with the supervisor or director of the unit. This may be criticized as 
too permissive. Conceivably, supervisors might be in COI with their staff. Also, although 
supervisors might be well qualified academically and have management experience, they might 
not have the negotiation skills, training, expertise or familiarity with various cases of COI in order 
to evaluate the situation and provide appropriate recommendations. The process at Montreal 
appears to be more direct: more than one person considers the matter and there is a formal 
appeals committee that reviews all COI that are particularly problematic. Such an institutional 
process might be even more objective if the committee were completely external to the unit in 
which a COI has arisen. But as already noted in the case of Waterloo, Montreal COI committees 
might also suffer from inadequate training or knowledge of how to fairly and effectively assess 
cases of COI found in their departments. Thus committees may appear to provide effective 
oversight while in fact falling far short of this goal. To be effective, a committee must not only 
have knowledge of their particular department to understand the importance of specific external 
influences in their field of study; they must also have an understanding of the relevant ethical 
approaches to managing COI.  
 
Availability 
To be effective in guiding or regulating faculty, staff or student behaviour, university COI policies 
must be easily accessible; a policy cannot work if the individuals concerned are unaware of its 
existence. Common means of disseminating university policies involve: the inclusion of policy 
information in staff and student handbooks; individual mailing of specific documents; and 
posting of policies on institutional websites. The obvious limitation of these approaches is their 
passive nature; there is no incentive for faculty, staff and students – people who are often 
already very busy with a range of other activities – to read the documentation they receive, or to 
search for such information online. Accessibility of COI policies alone is insufficient for their 
effective implementation. It is critical to also raise awareness about the importance of COI and 
the need to follow or adopt practices consistent with the relevant institutional guidelines.  
 
The COI policies of Montreal and Waterloo are both available online at their respective 
university websites. Montreal’s COI policy can be found on the Human Resources webpage 
(Université de Montréal, 1993) and on a page listing all Official University Documents. 
Waterloo’s policy is located on the web pages of the University Secretariat (Policies section) 
and the Office of Research Ethics (Guidelines & Policies) (University of Waterloo, 1991). While 
both the Montreal and Waterloo documents are easily available (i.e., they are not buried on 
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obscure sub-pages, unlikely to be visited by members of the university community), many other 
Canadian COI policies are not so readily accessible (Williams-Jones and MacDonald, 2008). 
 
Conclusions & Recommendations  
In this paper, we examined the different governance approaches, philosophical underpinnings, 
and styles of two university COI policies: one at the Université de Montreal that is legalistic in 
form, and the other at the University of Waterloo that is more inspirational. (Table 1 summarizes 
the key differences and similarities between these two policies.) 
Table 1 : Comparing Policies
 Université de Montréal University of Waterloo 
Style Highly structured, formal 
vocabulary 
Long sentences & paragraphs, 
simple vocabulary 
Preamble & General 
Philosophy 
Staff must avoid COI Staff must avoid or manage COI 
Definitions No definition Multiple definitions 
Examples Multiple, simple Detailed, classic cases 
Rules Simple, formal and rigid: if COI 
cannot be avoided, then 
disclose 
Complex, disclose COI to head of 




Bureaucratic committee Negotiation with unit supervisor 
Availability Easily available through website Easily available through website 
 
We have not here sought to develop an ideal university COI policy. As mentioned at the outset, 
the diversity of university institutional cultures and histories will likely undermine the utility of a 
single, one-size-fits-all, approach to policy development. Some universities may legitimately opt 
for COI policies that are more or less inspirational or legalistic in style; or they may seek to 
combine elements of both approaches in a hybrid document that reflects their particular 
institutional culture. What our comparison offers, we suggest, is a clear description of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The following recommendations, some of which 
may appear to be simple common sense, are our informed opinions following a detailed 
analysis of 2 COI policies (Montreal and Waterloo), and a more general analysis of policies at 
13 Canadian universities (Williams-Jones and MacDonald, 2008). These recommendations are 
intended to inform and guide faculty and administrators involved in the process of drafting or 
updating university COI policies.  
 
The policy should be concise, as is often the advantage with more legalistic policies such as 
that of Montreal; a long document is likely to be ignored by busy staff and students. However, to 
facilitate understanding and uptake, the policy should be readable and avoid stilted legalistic 
vocabulary that is often opaque to even an educated audience. Instead, simple and clear 
language, such as that found in the Waterloo policy, would facilitate understanding of the key 
issues and procedures. The preamble is an important starting point in building such an 
understanding, as it underlines the main values and goals of the policy. It is essential to state 
clearly, as does the Waterloo policy, why it is important to abide by such a policy. This approach 
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can contribute to further dialogue and consensus building with regards to the appropriate 
management of COI. 
 
A clear definition of COI is essential. It must be relevant and current; clear and 
comprehensive enough to apply and encompass potential, apparent, and actual COI; and able 
to distinguish conflicts of commitment. Examples are also important as they add a more 
practical or grounded understanding of the various types of COI that may arise within the 
diversity that is the university setting. Rules about how to manage COI must be clear and 
concise. It is important to remember that more rigid and formal rules-based regimes can 
present real problems in their practical application; as in the case of the Montreal policy, a focus 
on prohibiting or avoiding COI may entail that unavoidable or manageable COI end up being 
hidden, thus defeating the purpose of the policy. The management of COI on a case-by-case 
basis may offer a better way of raising issues and fostering greater consensus among the staff 
and the university. Nevertheless, certain types of COI, i.e., significant financial interests or 
institutional COI, may be best dealt with though formal or legalistic guidelines that provide little 
room for interpretation; it is an open question, though, whether these issues should be treated 
through separate specific policies, or as part of general university COI policies.  
 
The procedures for resolving COI must ensure impartiality. The individual or committee 
who evaluates all disclosures must not be involved with the COI. If the resources are available, 
an external review committee would be optimal. However, there is an important caveat: the 
review committee must also have the necessary negotiation skills, training, expertise and 
familiarity with various cases of COI in order to properly assess the situation. In our (Williams-
Jones’) experience with various committees, such expertise is invariably lacking, and the 
process is essentially bureaucratic. Finally, the policy should be accessible to all members 
of the university community through, at a minimum, posting on a prominent page of the main 
university website (e.g., on Human Resources and Research web pages). Furthermore, when 
new faculty or staff are hired, they should receive information about COI (including the university 
policy) as part of their orientation packages. Without such accessibility, policies cannot be 
expected to guide behaviour or have any useful impact on the management of COI. 
 
A COI policy is a necessary component to promoting ethical behaviour, but it is far from 
sufficient (Elliott, 2008). It is therefore essential that members of institutions not only be 
educated about the content of various policies, but that administrators help foster an ethical 
culture within which COI policies are acknowledged, debated, understood and ultimately 
respected. As in the business environment, compliance with a policy can be promoted by a 
culture of ethics (Arjoon, 2005). We thus suggest that ‘good’ COI policies are a fundamental 
element to promoting transparency and integrity, and enabling the development of a culture of 
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Appendix 1: Université de Montréal 
Université de Montréal – Official Guidelines, Policies and Procedures 
 
Number : 10.23 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Adoption (French version) 1993-06-01 CU-361-9  
 
The document hereinafter does not confer any right to any person in any manner and does not 
constitute a legal interpretation.  
 
Only the French version of the said document is legally binding.  
 
PREAMBLE 
Members of the University personnel are likely to be placed in conflict-of-interest situations in 
the performance of their duties or in the pursuit of extramural activities. 
To ensure transparency and integrity while at the same time respecting the autonomy of the 
University, the Université de Montréal has decided to adopt regulations for avoiding conflict of 
interest situations and, where necessary, protecting both university staff and the institution itself. 
These regulations require all members to disclose activities from which real, potential or 
perceived conflict-of-interest situations may arise. The regulations also stipulate procedures for 
dealing with these disclosures. 
 
Article 1 APPLICATION 
1.1 The present regulations shall apply to all teaching and non-teaching personnel. 
 
Article 2 RULES 
2.1 All university personnel shall avoid any situation which may entail choosing between 
personal interests, monetary or other, and those of the University. 
2.2 All teaching personnel shall be obligated to disclose to the committee created for this 
purpose, any real, potential or perceived conflict-of-interest situation so that appropriate 
measures may be taken to safeguard the interests of the University. 
2.3 All non-teaching personnel shall be obligated to disclose to the Head of their unit, any real, 
potential or perceived conflict-of-interest situation so that appropriate measures may be taken to 
safeguard the interests of the University. 
2.4 All members of personnel who consider themselves to be in conflict of interest with a 
member of the Unit Committee or the Head of Unit, as the case may be, may disclose directly to 
the Appeals Committee any real, potential or perceived conflict of interest so that appropriate 
measures may be taken to safeguard the interest of the University. 
 
Article 3 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
3.1 Without limiting the general scope of these Regulations, conflict of interest may arise in 
cases where a member of the personnel: 
a) Directly or indirectly has monetary or other interests in an external enterprise that deals or is 
likely to deal with the University; 
b) enters into an agreement with an external enterprise in which the member directly or 
indirectly has monetary or other interests; 
c) Gears his or her research activities at the University so as to cater to the needs of an external 
enterprise in which the member, directly or indirectly, has monetary or other interests; 
d) conducts teaching or research activities for an external enterprise without regard for the rights 
of the University; 
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e) Conducts activities, professional or other, which, because of their time commitment, are likely 
to interfere with or prevent the performance and the member’s duties at the University or 
compete with University activities; 
f) Accepts a gift or favour in any form from an external enterprise that deals with the 
University; 
g) Uses for personal purposes, or for the benefit of a third party, University resources or time, 
which, according to the member's definition of duties, should be devoted to the University; 
h) Uses the name, emblem or insignia of the University, as well as the name of its associations 
or organizations to serve personal interests; 
i) Participates in the employment or promotion, at the University, of members of his or her family 
or other persons with whom the member is associated; 
j) Uses for personal for personal purposes or for the benefit of a third party confidential 
information acquired as a result of the member's duties at the University. 
 
Article 4 PROCEDURES FOR DISCLOSURE 
4.1 Every year, on the date determined by the person responsible for the application of these 
Regulations, members shall complete the prescribed form to disclose, if necessary, any real, 
potential or perceived conflict-of-interest situation in which they may be involved. 
4.2 During the year, members shall complete a new disclosure form if a conflict of-interest 
situation arises that had not been foreseen at the time of the annual disclosure. 
4.3 The forms shall be submitted, within the prescribed time limits, as the case may be, to the 
immediate superior or to the Appeals Committee. 
 
Article 5 TREATMENT OF DISCLOSURES 
5.1 Teaching Personnel 
Unit Committee 
Each non-departmentalized faculty, department, school, institute and research centre shall 
create a committee composed of the Head as chair and two professors appointed by for a Unit 
assembly a three-year term. 
This committee shall deal with the disclosures made by the teaching staff of the unit. 
5.2 Non-teaching Personnel 
Each head of unit shall deal with the disclosures made by staff members under his or her 
supervision and shall inform the person responsible for the application of these Regulations of 
the measures taken to resolve conflicts of interest. 
 
Article 6 APPEALS COMMITTEE 
6.1 The Appeals Committee shall be composed of five members including at least one member 
of the non-teaching personnel. The University Council and the University Assembly shall each 
appoint two members to said committee for a three-year term. These members shall appoint a 
fifth member who shall chair the committee. 
6.2 This Committee shall rule on cases submitted to it in writing, within 30 days of the decision 
rendered by the Unit Committee or the Unit Head, as the case may be. 
6.3 This Committee shall also receive, in the first instance, the statements from any member 
who considers himself or herself to be in conflict of interest with a member of the Unit 
Committee or the Unit Head, as the case may be. 
6.4 This Committee may also, of its own initiative, suggest methods of resolving the conflicts of 
interest and, to this end, may obtain any information relating to the measures taken to resolve 
these conflicts or any relevant information. 
 
Article 7 APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS 
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7.1 The Rector, or the Vice-Rector designated by the Rector, shall be responsible for the 
application of these Regulations. He or she, in concertation with the Appeals Committee shall 
report to the University Assembly and the University Council three years after the 
implementation hereof and shall suggest, where necessary, amendments hereto. 
 
Article 8 COMING INTO FORCE 
8.1 These Regulations shall come into force on the day following their adoption by the 
University Assembly and the University Council. 
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Appendix 2: University of Waterloo 
Policy 69 – Conflict of Interest 
Established: April 2, 1991 
 
I. PREAMBLE 
A conflict of interest [1], or a potential conflict of interest, exists when a member of the University 
is or may be in a position to use research, knowledge, authority or influence for personal or 
family gain or to benefit others to the detriment of the institution. 
 
II. GENERAL PHILOSOPHY AND PROCEDURES 
The University acknowledges a commitment, as part of its overall mandate, to transfer 
knowledge, discoveries and technology to society for its benefit. Interaction of members of the 
University with external entities is desirable and encouraged when the activity is beneficial to the 
professional standing of the individual, the reputation of the University or provides a community 
or professional service. Whatever the nature of the external activities or relationships, the 
University expects each of its members – faculty, staff, student or officer – to act in a manner 
consistent with a high standard of integrity and ethical behavior. Accordingly, the University of 
Waterloo obligates its members and officers acting on its behalf to avoid ethical, legal, financial 
or other conflicts of interest which may impede or compromise their University responsibilities or 
the mission of the institution. 
 
This policy is meant to protect both the individual and the institution. Its fundamental tenet is that 
members should, of their own volition, take the initiative in disclosing conflicts or potential 
conflict of interest situations. The mere existence of a conflict or a potential conflict does not 
necessarily imply that the activity concerned should cease. Indeed, conflicts may cover a broad 
spectrum from those that are minor and easily controlled to those whose consequences could 
be very serious. There are situations sufficiently complex that judgments may differ as to 
whether a conflict exists. Accordingly, any member of the University community with a conflict or 
potential conflict should seek the counsel and advice of her/his immediate supervisor and 
disclose the details to that individual. A disclosure form (see next page) is available for this 
purpose. 
 
The immediate supervisor (in consultation with her/his supervisor, when appropriate) will 
determine whether a conflict, real or potential, exists. In the event that a conflict exists or will 
exist, the immediate supervisor and the member will agree on a course of action to monitor or 
avoid the conflict, after which written documentation of the agreement will be held by both the 
member and her/his immediate supervisor. In the event that agreement cannot be reached, the 
case will be referred through the appropriate line management channels for resolution, up to 
and including the Vice-President, Academic & Provost, if necessary. 
 
It is assumed that those with academic or employment supervisory authority who detect what 
they believe to be violations of this policy will act promptly to provide or initiate the appropriate 
remedial or disciplinary measures as set out in other University policies, procedures and 
agreements (including 18, 33, 36, 62, 71 and the Memorandum of Agreement). 
 
III. EXAMPLES 
The following list of examples, while not comprehensive, is illustrative of situations which may 
lead to an indirect or direct conflict of interest: 
 
Favoring of Outside Interests for Personal Gain: 
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• Entering into a research contract with a company in which the faculty or staff member, or 
a member of her/his immediate family, has a financial or other interest. 
• Directing the faculty member’s government sponsored research program to serve the 
research or development needs of a private firm in which the faculty member has a 
financial or other interest. 
• Influencing the purchase of equipment or materials for the University from a company in 
which the faculty or staff member has a financial or other interest. 
• Accepting significant gifts or special favors for personal gain from private organizations 
with which the University does business. 
• Entering into a licensing agreement for the development of intellectual property, 
generated as a result of University research, with a company in which the faculty or staff 
member has a financial or other interest. 
 
Inappropriate Use of University Personnel, Resources or Assets: 
• When a supervising faculty or staff member uses University students or staff on 
University time to carry out work on her/his own behalf for a company in which he/she 
has a financial or other interest. 
• Unauthorized and non-reimbursed use of University resources or facilities to benefit a 
private concern in which the faculty or staff member has a financial or other interest. 
 
Inappropriate Use of Information: 
• Using for personal gain, or other unauthorized purposes, privileged information acquired 
as a result of the faculty or staff member’s University-supported activities; such 
information might include knowledge of forthcoming developments requiring contractor 
or sub-contractor selection, bulk purchases, etc. 
• Unreasonably delaying publication of research results (e.g., thesis research) or 
premature announcement of research results to secure personal gain. 
 
Conflict of Commitment: 
• Undertaking external consulting, professional or other activities which, by virtue of their 
time commitment, prevent the faculty or staff member from fulfilling her/his obligations to 
the University. 
• Involvement in external organizations which bring a faculty or staff member into a 
position of divided loyalty between the mission of the University and the interests of the 
external organization. 
 
Inappropriate Involvement in Appointment Processes: 
• Participating in the appointment, promotion or hiring of a person with whom the faculty or 
staff member has a marital, familial or sexual relationship. 
 
DISCLOSURE FORMS 
[Disclosure forms are available on the web and/or from the Secretariat.] 
 
BACKGROUND RE: DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES ON CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST 
Preamble 
The potential for conflict of interest has always existed in university communities because of the 
diverse interactions of faculty, staff and graduate students with external organizations. However, 
the increasing complexity of society and the changing role of universities in that society, the 
multiplicity of interuniversity, university-industry and university-community relations have created 
a new awareness of the need for guidelines concerning conflict of interest. Few will argue that 
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while the basic mandate of universities – education, research and scholarship, and public 
service – remains, each institution is struggling to define its own distinctive role and to cope with 
the reality of a new financial environment. Rapid developments in science and technology over 
the past two decades, and the realization that transfer of technology from universities to the 
private sector can contribute significantly to international competitiveness, have generated 
pressures and financial incentives to engage in cooperative research ventures, consulting or 
external business relationships. More than ever before, faculty, staff, graduate students and 
administrators are being asked to engage in a diverse range of economic development activities 
which carry the potential for conflict of interest. Unless such conflicts are identified and 
monitored, the very essence of the university mission may be compromised. 
 
Defining Conflict of Interest 
Conflicts of interest may be individual or institutional. An individual conflict can be defined as 
any external activity or undertaking which places an individual in a position which: 
A. influences University research, education or business for personal gain, or 
B. interferes with or prevents the discharge of her/his University responsibilities, as defined by 
the individual’s employment contract; this is, in reality, a conflict of commitment. 
 
The overall thrust of this definition is that the best interests of the University may be 
compromised to the personal benefit of the individual employee. 
 
Individual conflicts of interest often derive directly or indirectly from opportunities to participate in 
externally funded research and in a subsequent interplay between the results of the research 
and a faculty member’s personal or financial interests. Such situations frequently place faculty 
and staff members in a position to manage contracts, select equipment and supplies, involve 
graduate students in sponsored research or play administrative roles which demand the utmost 
in integrity and honesty. Even the appearance of an apparent conflict can have a negative 
impact on the University and the individual in the eyes of the community. 
 
Institutional conflicts of interest may occur when the University enters into contractual 
relationships with external bodies, usually private corporations but sometimes government 
agencies, which bring it into potential conflict with its mandate, with the personal activities of its 
Board of Governors or even its status as an educational institution. These potential institutional 
conflicts must be monitored by its governing bodies. 
 
Ethical Principles 
In drafting a conflict of interest policy for the University, the Committee was cognizant of both 
the positive and negative aspects of that part of the University’s mission which can be described 
as “service to society”. On the one hand, the University has an implicit obligation to transmit 
knowledge and the results of research to society for its benefit. On the other hand, the financial 
incentives and pressures to contribute to economic and societal well-being have, in the minds of 
some, distorted University priorities and led to an erosion of autonomy and independence. In 
this changing environment, it is of paramount importance that the institution have in place a 
code of ethics which obligates its faculty, staff, students and officers acting on its behalf to avoid 
ethical, financial or legal conflicts which prejudice the best interests of the University. Thus, a 
policy on conflict of interest should be an integral component of an entire matrix of policies on 
ethical behavior in general at the University of Waterloo. 
 
Policy Type 
Clearly, defining the entire spectrum of potential conflict of interest situations, both individual 
and institutional, would be a daunting task. Furthermore, the generation of an exhaustive list of 
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restrictions designed to eradicate conflicts would most certainly compromise the ability of the 
University to create an environment conducive to the discovery and dissemination of 
knowledge, the search for truth and understanding, the quality of life and the needs of society. 
The Committee became convinced that the best interests of the institution would not be served 
by a restrictive “do not” policy. Such a rigid approach would run counter to the freedom to 
innovate and the spirit of entrepreneurship which have characterized the University of Waterloo 
throughout its brief history. Accordingly, the Committee opted for the disclosure route in defining 
a conflict of interest policy. 
 
Identifying Potential Conflict Situations 
One of the keys to any conflict of interest policy relying on disclosure is the ability of individual 
employees in the institution to recognize possible conflict of interest situations so that they can, 
in good faith, be recorded and managed. The Committee felt that it would be very useful to 
provide a list of situations which may be of concern in order to alert employees to potential 
problem areas. This list can be found in the “Examples” section of the policy on Conflict of 
Interest.  
 
[1] Statements pertaining to conflict of interest situations are contained in other UW policies, 
including: 33 (Ethical Behaviour); 40, 44, 45, 48, 50 and 68 (re Academic Administrators); 41 
(Contract Research); 49 (Extra-University Activity); 52 (Private Corporations); 62 (Conflict of 
Interest in Employment & Supervision of Personnel); 66 (Use of University Resources and 
Affiliation); 77 (Tenure and Promotion). 
 
